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Abstract—Security management is about calculated risk and
requires continuous evaluation to ensure cost, time and resource
effectiveness. Parts of which is to make future-oriented, cost-
benefit investments in security. Security investments must adhere
to healthy business principles where both security and financial
aspects play an important role. Information on the current and
potential risk level is essential to successfully trade-off security
and financial aspects.
Risk level is the combination of the frequency and impact
of a potential unwanted event, often referred to as a security
threat or misuse. The paper presents a risk level estimation
model that derives risk level as a conditional probability over
frequency and impact estimates. The frequency and impact
estimates are derived from a set of attributes specified in the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The model
works on the level of vulnerabilities (just as the CVSS) and is
able to compose vulnerabilities into service levels. The service
levels define the potential risk levels and are modelled as a
Markov process, which are then used to predict the risk level at
a particular time.
Index Terms—Quantifying security, Operational security, Risk
estimation, Calculated risk and CVSS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern society relies heavily on networked information
systems. The risks associated with these systems might have
serious implications, such as threatening the financial and
physical well being of people and organizations. E.g., the
unavailability of a telemedicine system might result in loss
of life and an Internet-based organization can be put out of
business as a result of a successful denial of service (DoS)
attack. However, security investment must be balanced with
potential losses, as an Internet-based organization may very
well be put out of business if forced to raise sales prices to
compensate for overspending on security measures.
Security management covers all from operational security to
enterprise level security strategy, and in particular the relation
between these. Often, the cause of a security problem is on the
operational level while the impact is on the strategic or busi-
ness/enterprise level. It then becomes important to distinguish
the cause from the consequence events to effectively place
security measures. In any case, the goal is to balance security
investments with potential losses associated with future secu-
rity breaches and with the real losses already experienced. We
call this to derive at a balanced and controlled risk level and
to take calculated risks. However, this cannot be done without
insight into the vulnerabilities on the operational level and the
impacts that these might have on the strategic level. Without
this knowledge it is hard to evaluate the effectiveness of a
security measure on the operational level and to build effective
security strategies for the enterprise level.
This paper focuses on the operational level and how to relate
local operational security flaws to the strategic level, here
represented by the ISO 14508 [1] notion Target of Evaluation
(ToE). The risk level estimation model is limited to the overall
system perspective, called ToE in this paper, and do not
discuss the financial aspects involved. Details on the financial
aspects and how operational security relates to strategic or
enterprise security are in Houmb (2007) [2]. A ToE can be
any part of a system/network or the whole system/network
and is used to denote the object in need of or being managed.
The risk level estimation model focuses on vulnerabilities on
the operational level (note that vulnerabilities may also be on
the strategic level, such as in the security processes or the
way people use a security measure) and uses the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) to derive the risk level.
The risk level is derived over impact and frequency estimates,
which are directly estimated from CVSS information in e.g.
the NVD (National Vulnerability Database maintained by
NIST). We call the potential undesired events (consequences
of vulnerability exploits) for misuse and denote the frequency
and impact of these as misuse frequency (MF) and misuse
impact (MI). This is to distinguish the operational level from
the strategic level.
The CVSS is an effort to provide a universal and vendor-
independent score of known vulnerabilities. This initiative is
funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and
maintained by FIRST1 (www.first.org). The CVSS score is a
decimal number on the scale [0.0,10.0] and is composed of the
three metrics groups: base, temporal and environmental [3].
In the ToE risk level estimation model, we extend beyond
the current use of these metrics groups to estimate misuse
frequency and impacts. The implementation of the model is
described in Houmb, Franqueira and Engum (2008) [4].
The remainder of the paper is structured as following.
Section II places the ToE risk estimation model into context
of related work and outlines the contribution of this paper.
Section III introduces the CVSS and describes the three CVSS
metrics groups. Section IV describes how to use the CVSS
to estimate misuse frequency (MF) and misuse impact (MI).
Section V outlines the ToE risk level estimation model and
its underlying computational procedure (procedure used to
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derive ToE risk level from MF and MI estimates). Section VI
demonstrates how to use the ToE risk level estimation model
on an example ToE. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper
and points to future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The current strategies for controlling security risks are:
(i) penetration and patch, (ii) standards, (iii) security risk
management/assessment and (iv) “wait and see”. The latter is
similar to the first, only different in that penetration and patch
often includes authorised penetration and patch activities, such
as tiger-team activity. “Wait and see” is a passive security
strategy where problems are fixed if budget allows and only
after the fact.
Standards provide tools for evaluating the security controls
of systems. Examples of such are ISO 15408:2007 Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation [1]
(includes schema for certification of IT Products, in addition
to security best practises) and the ISO/IEC 27000 series, such
as ISO/IEC 27002:2005 Information technology – Security
techniques – Code of Practice for Information Security Man-
agement [5]. However, most evaluations are a qualitative and
subjective activity biased by the evaluator (even though they
follow a standard). The ToE risk level estimation model is
based on CVSS, which is an open standard that also reveals
the details behind the scores provided. Furthermore, CVSS is
regularly updated and several information sources is taken into
consideration when calculating the CVSS score.
Risk assessment was initially developed within the safety
domain, but has later been adapted to security critical systems
as security risk assessment. The two most relevant approaches
are CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Methodology
(CRAMM) [6] and the CORAS framework [7]. CRAMM
targets health-care information systems and is asset-driven.
The CORAS framework is inspired by CRAMM and has
adapted the asset-driven strategy of CRAMM.
The main deficiency of most security risk assessment ap-
proaches is that the focus is not on calculated risks, meaning
that there has not been a prior activity on deciding which
risk to accept, and not based on some cost-benefit strategy.
To do so, it is necessary to obtain knowledge on potential
attack paths, cost of attacks both for the attacker and the ToE
owner, probability or frequency of attacks from an operational
perspective and the potential impacts these may have on the
strategic level. Calculating risk requires a quantitative analysis
of the risk level. These are the challenges examined in the
research domain quantifying security or operational security.
An initial model towards quantitative measures for opera-
tional security was discussed in Littlewood et al. (1993) [8].
The model derives operational measures such as mean time
and effort to security breach. These concepts were further
explored by Madan et al. (2002) [9] and Wang et al. (2003)
[10]. Madan et al. (2002) discuss how to quantify security at-
tributes of software systems using traditional reliability theory
for modelling random processes, such as stochastic modelling
and Markov analysis. In Wang et al. (2003) this idea was taken
one step further using the higher level formalism Stochastic
Petri Nets (SPN). Most of all, [10] discussed the problem
of state exploitation and the inconvenience of the memory-
less property of Markov processes. SPN deals with the state
exploitations and in particularly the gigantic task of manually
constructing a Markov chain. This model was extended to
Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) in Houmb and Sallhammar (2005)
[11]. However, neither SPN nor CPN tackle the increasing
challenge of lack of data on how a system may react to
certain security attacks, as the trend for potential and future
security attacks still is largely unknown. At this point still little
was known about the motivation and behaviour of attackers.
Today, some more information exists, such as in vulnerabilities
bulletins and attack trend reports. CVSS is an example of such.
The benefit of CVSS is that it addresses the vulnerabilities
directly and in collaboration with the vendors of the affected
products. That is, CVSS tries to be specific and do not attempt
to categorize attacks on a general basis nor does it provide a
general model for estimating risk level. CVSS purely provide
information about vulnerabilities on an operational level and
leaves it to the vendors to add the information specific for their
products and to the customers to interpret the information in
the perspective of a particular ToE.
There are also other ways to measure risk exposure, such as
Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE). However, the lack of quan-
titative data and the rapidly changing security environment
makes it hard to derive accurate measures over such a long
time-period.
Security trade-off analysis, as discussed in Houmb et al.
(2005a) [12] and Houmb et al. (2006) [13], looks at security
from a cost-benefit perspective in respect to financial and
project factors, such as budget and time-to-market. However,
the challenge is still on measuring the risk level in an ac-
curate manner. An example of such for the security attribute
availability is provided in Houmb et al. (2005b)[14], where an
availability estimation model based on system service levels
is outlined. The ToE risk level estimation model described in
this paper extend the service level idea from [14].
Regarding the CVSS and its use there are few relevant
works. Boehm, Chen and Sheppard (2007) [15] and Chen
(2008) [16] discuss an approach to measuring security invest-
ment benefits for off the shelf software systems using CVSS.
The argument made by the authors is that the CVSS may be
misleading, as it does not incorporate the value context. Rather
than using the environment variables of CVSS to give context
to the values, the authors propose a AHP approach that focus
on stakeholders values such as productivity, reputation and
privacy of the systems where the vulnerabilities are located.
However, both productivity and repudiation is of a subjective
nature and hard to measure. That is, different stakeholders
may have different perception on the extent that a vulnerability
might affect the productivity. Our opinion is that it is better
to use the environmental metrics as given in the CVSS, as
stakeholders most often finds it easier to evaluate confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability than productivity, reputation
and privacy.
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In Dondo (2008) [17], an approach to vulnerability pri-
oritisation using fuzzy risk analysis is presented. Here, the
construct asset value (AV) is used to derive the risk level or
risks to a system. The asset value (AV) is assumed given. The
approach derives risk level based on the CVSS base metrics
variables, a measure of time from when the vulnerability was
reported and the safeguards already in the system. The author
applies fuzzy rules to compute impact (I) and likelihood (L)
and derive risk level as: AV x I x L. This approach is similar to
our model, but our model does not use fuzzy rules. Our model
uses the temporal and environmental metric groups given in
the CVSS to estimate the risk level rather than asset value and
safeguard. Asset value is not always easy to evaluate and might
be stakeholder specific. AV is not a generalsable variable, but
rather context and stakeholder specific. By basing our model
on the temporal and environmental information given in the
CVSS we use easily accessible and publicly open context
information that is regularly updated and maintained, has a
stable data model and that is used by many commercial parties.
Also, the underlying equations (that is how the scores or values
are computed) are public knowledge for CVSS.
III. COMMON VULNERABILITY SCORING SYSTEM
(CVSS)
The CVSS is an effort to provide a universal and vender-
independent score of known vulnerabilities. The system is on
its second version and currently maintained by FIRST. The
CVSS has since it was launched in 2004 been adopted by
several vendors and vulnerability tools and bulletins. Exam-
ples are hardware and software development companies like
IBM, HP and Cisco as a reporting metric, in vulnerability
bulletins, by scanning vendor tools like Nessus and Qualys
and by the NIST, which maintains the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD); the main repository of known vulnerabilities
worldwide.
The CVSS score is a decimal number on the scale [0.0,10.0]
and is composed of three metrics groups: base, temporal
and environmental [3]. The base metrics group quantifies
the intrinsic characteristics (i.e. attributes) of a vulnerability
using two sub-scores: (i) exploitability sub-score and (ii)
impact sub-score. The exploitability sub-score is composed of
access vector (B AR) (type of access required to exploit the
vulnerability in terms of local, adjacent network or network),
access complexity (B AC) (complexity involved in exploiting
the vulnerability after the ToE has been identified in terms
of high, medium or low), and authentication (B Au) (number
of authentication instances required once the ToE has been
accessed in terms of multiple, one or none). The impact sub-
score expresses the potential impact on confidentiality (B C),
integrity (B I) and availability (B A) that the exploitation
of the vulnerability can cause in terms of none, partial or
complete.
Experts (from NIST) analyse each known vulnerability
(called CVE 2) and assign qualitative values to each attribute.
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For the base metrics they assign a rating (i.e. a qualitative
value) for each attribute mentioned above. Based on these
qualitative values, the CVSS system calculates scores us-
ing the pre-defined rating scales shown in Tables I and II.
Therefore, if a CVE is assessed by NIST experts as hav-
ing access=“Network”, complexity=“Low” and authentica-
tion=“None”, the CVSS calculator returns the highest possible
exploitability sub-score; 10.0. Similarly, “Complete” impact
for Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability returns the high-
est possible impact sub-score; also 10.0. Each CVE reports:
(i) the base score, (ii) the exploitability and impact sub-
scores and (iii) the base vector from which the base score has
been derived. For example, CVE-1999-0196 has base vector:
[AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N] corresponding to base score
5.0, exploitability sub-score 10.0 and impact sub-score 2.9.
The other metric groups; temporal and environmental, are
either time or context-dependent and therefore not included in
the NVD. The CVSS guide [3] defines these scores as follows.
The temporal metrics group quantifies dynamic aspects of
a vulnerability using the three attributes: exploitability tools
& techniques (T E), remediation level (T RL) and report
confidence (T RC). The exploitability attribute refers to the
availability of code or techniques for exploiting a vulnerability
and is evaluated in terms of: unproved, proof-of-concept,
functional or high. The remediation level attribute refers to
the type of remediation available for the vulnerability in
terms of official fix, temporary fix, workaround or unavailable.
The report confidence attribute refers to the trustworthiness
(quality) of the information available for the vulnerability in
terms of: unconfirmed, uncorroborated (conflicting sources
of information) or confirmed. For all attributes the list of
options (i.e. ratings) reflects increasing levels of exploitability.
Furthermore, temporal attribute values are likely to change
during the vulnerability life cycle as exploit code, official fixes
and more reliable information about the vulnerability become
available over time.
The environmental metrics group quantifies three aspects
of a vulnerability that are dependent on the environment and on
stakeholders’ values: (i) collateral damage potential (E CDP),
(ii) target distribution and (iii) security requirements. The
collateral damage potential is a measure of the potential dam-
age that exploiting the vulnerability may have to loss of life,
physical asset loss, loss of revenue and loss of productivity.
E CDP is measured according to the qualitative scale {none,
low, low-medium, medium-high, high}. The security require-
ments included are confidentiality (E CR), integrity (E IR)
and availability (E AR), which are all measured according
to the qualitative scale: {low, medium, high}. Although the
environmental attributes can eventually change over time, they
are not as dynamic as the temporal attributes. In addition, they
are specific to a particular ToE, while the temporal attributes
are specific to a particular vulnerability. Note that the target
distribution attribute is not explored in this paper.
More details on the CVSS metrics groups and on the CVSS
calculator are in the CVSS guide [3].
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IV. ESTIMATING MI AND MF USING CVSS
We use the CVSS to estimate the two variables MF and
MI. In fact, we rearrange the CVSS attributes to calculate MF
and MI instead of base, temporal and environmental scores.
The more exploitable a vulnerability is, the more likely it
is to be exploited by attackers, and thus the MF will be
higher. We are able to calculate MF for each vulnerability
present in the ToE by first considering the exploitability factors
intrinsic to the vulnerability itself (i.e. the base metrics related
to exploitability), and then the temporal factors capable to
lower the exploitability. The same rationale applies to impact:
the potential impact intrinsic to a vulnerability (i.e. the base
metrics related to impact) can be increased or decreased
depending on the security requirements to the ToE.
Tables I and II show the attributes and rating values from
CVSS that we use.
CVSS metrics group CVSS attribute rating rating value
base metrics
access required (B AR)
local (L) 0.395
adjacent network (A) 0.646
network (N) 1.0
attack complexity (B AC)
high (H) 0.35
medium (M) 0.61
low (L) 0.71
authentication instances
(B Au)
multiple (M) 0.45
single (S) 0.56
none (N) 0.704
temporal metrics
exploitability tools &
techniques (T E)
unproved (U) 0.85
proof-of-concept (POC) 0.9
functional (F) 0.95
high (H) 1.0
remediation level (T RL)
official fix (OF) 0.87
temporary fix (TF) 0.90
workaround (W) 0.95
unavailable (U) 1.0
report confidence (T RC)
unconfirmed (UC) 0.90
uncorroborative (UR) 0.95
confirmed (C) 1.0
TABLE I
CVSS ATTRIBUTES USED FOR THE ESTIMATION OF MF
CVSS metrics group CVSS attribute rating rating value
base metrics
confidentiality impact
(B C)
none (N) 0.0
partial (P) 0.275
complete (C) 0.660
integrity impact (B I)
none (N) 0.0
partial (P) 0.275
complete (C) 0.660
availability impact (B A)
none (N) 0.0
partial (P) 0.275
complete (C) 0.660
environmental
metrics
confidentiality
requirement (E CR)
low (L) 0.5
medium (M) 1.0
high (H) 1.51
integrity requirement
(E IR)
low (L) 0.5
medium (M) 1.0
high (H) 1.51
availability requirement
(E AR)
low (L) 0.5
medium (M) 1.0
high (H) 1.51
collateral damage
potential (E CDP)
none (N) 0.0
low (L) 0.1
lowmedium (LM) 0.3
mediumhigh (MH) 0.4
high (H) 0.5
TABLE II
CVSS ATTRIBUTES USED FOR THE ESTIMATION OF MI
A. Estimating MF from base and temporal data
We use three attributes from the base metrics and three
attributes from the temporal metrics to derive the misuse fre-
quency (MF). These are: access required (B AR), attack com-
plexity (B AC) and authentication instances (B Au) from the
base metrics, and exploitability tools & techniques (T E),
remediation level (T RL) and report confidence (T RC)
from the temporary metrics. As the CVSS base metrics refers
directly to the exploitability of a vulnerability, we use the
base metrics attributes to estimate the initial misuse frequency
(MF). This is done in Equation 1. From the CVSS we also get
the internal dependencies between the basic metrics attributes.
These are not directly shown in Equation 1 as these may
change when new knowledge about attacks becomes available.
The CVSS is dynamic and will be updated to reflect such
knowledge. More details are in Section VI.
The initial MF is then updated with the temporal metrics
attributes. The temporal metrics attributes cover the indirect
factors relevant for the exploitability of a vulnerability. The
updating is done in a two step manner: first an update factor
(uFac) is derived in Equation 2, then this update factor is
applied to the initial misuse frequency to derive the resulting
misuse frequency estimate (Equation 3). The details on the
categories for each attribute (both basic and temporal) is in
Table I. Note that the MF equations do not evaluate the value
of each of the attributes. This activity is done as part of
inserting input to each attribute in the MF equation set, which
is demonstrated in Section VI.
Furthermore, the resulting MF estimate (derived in Equation
3) must be normalized, as it should always be a value in
the range [0, 1] (negative probability does not make sense
and an event cannot be higher than certain; P = 1.0). The
value 0 means that the vulnerability will never be exploited
and the value 1 means that the vulnerability will for certain
be exploited. Values in the range < 0, 0.5 > means low
possibility for exploits and values in the range < 0.5, 1.0 >
means high possibility for exploits. The value 0.5 should be
interpreted as that it is just as likely that the vulnerability will
be exploited as it will not.
MFinit =
∫
N 1
P (B AR,B AC,B Au) (1)
MFuFac =
∫
N 1
P (T E, T RL, T RC) (2)
MF =
∫
N 1
(MFinit ×MFuFac) (3)
B. Estimating MI from base and environmental data
The variable misuse impact (MI) is used to group vulnera-
bilities into states for the state transition model and to associate
vulnerabilities to service levels. We use four attributes from
the base metrics and three attributes from the environmental
metrics to derive the MI estimate. These are: confidentiality
impact (B C), integrity impact (B I) and availability impact
(B A) from the base metrics, and confidentiality requirement
(E CR), integrity requirement (E IR), availability require-
ment (E AR) and collateral damage potential (E CDP )
from the environmental metrics. The environmental metrics
are context specific and puts the confidentiality, integrity and
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availability impacts into the perspective of the security require-
ments to and the collateral damage potential of a particular
ToE. This means that the base metrics describe the magnitude
of the effect on each security property individually, which is
then made ToE specific by applying the environmental metrics
to the base metrics.
Similar to MF, the base metrics are used to establish the
initial impact estimate, which is a vector over confidentiality,
integrity and availability, as specified in Equation 4. The
environmental metrics attributes are then used to update the
initial impact estimate vector and to derive the resulting impact
estimate vector. The updating is done in two steps. First
the initial impact estimate vector is updated to account for
the collateral damage potential (E CDP ) in Equation 5.
When this is done, the impact estimate vector is updated with
the security requirements information from the environmental
metrics in Equation 6. The resulting impact estimate vector is
derived in Equation 7.
MIinit = [B C,B I,B A] (4)
MICDP =
∫
N 1
E CDP [B C,B I,B A] (5)
MIEnv = [B CR,B IR,B AR] (6)
MI =
∫
N 1
MICDP ×MIEnv (7)
The resulting MI estimate vector (Equation 7) expresses the
severity of a particular vulnerability. It is this information
that we use to specify the service levels and to associate
vulnerabilities to service levels when deriving the ToE risk
level. The service levels are organized in a state transition
model (Markov process). The first state is always with no
impact on all of confidentiality, integrity and availability,
namely [0.0, 0.0, 0.0]. The last state in the state transition
model is always complete impact on all of confidentiality,
integrity and availability taking all the environmental metrics
attributes into consideration. That is: [1.0, 1.0, 1.0], which is
an absorbing state. This means that there is no repair ones
the ToE arrives at this state. Hence, the first state is always
associated with full service level SL0 and the last state is
always associated with no service SLx. All states in-between
can be full service, any level of degraded service or no service
and is ToE dependent.
V. DERIVING TOE RISK LEVEL FROM MF AND MI
ESTIMATES
We measure ToE risk level using service levels [19] ex-
pressed as a continuous-time Markov process [20]. A service
level is defined as a group of ToE states, each denoting a
specified degree of normal ToE accomplishment. The service
levels depend on the design and implementation of the ToE,
the structure of the ToE and the application of the ToE;
that is, the way the ToE is used. A degraded service may
be regarded as a full service for a certain application or by
a certain user. Service levels are therefore organization and
stakeholder specific. As described in the previous section, the
highest service level is service level 0 (SL0) or full service.
The lowest service level is service level x (SLx) or no service.
The ToE risk level model is supported by a two-step compu-
tational procedure: (1) Define the state transition model from
misuse impact estimates and (2) Determine state transition
rates from misuse frequency estimates. Step 1 is performed
by examining vulnerability bulletins and databases such as the
NVD and by running a vulnerability scanner such as Nessus
to derive a list of vulnerabilities resided in the ToE. However,
the latter is of various reasons not always possible to carry out
(not possible to open the necessary ports on the firewalls in the
network, the location of the ToE, etc.). The misuse frequency
and impact of each vulnerability is then estimated as described
in the previous section (Section IV).
The misuse impact of a vulnerability define its severity. This
does not necessary means that two vulnerabilities having the
same impact value pose the same severity to the ToE and
hence lead to the same decrease in ToE service level. Thus,
we need to define vulnerability severity level intervals and
associate these to service levels. This results in an ordered set
of service levels from no service level to full service level and
defines the state transition model. In Section VI we give an
example of a state transition model.
Definition A service level is a composite of a non-empty
set of vulnerabilities, all with severity level within one
particular severity level interval.
In Step 2 we examine the state transition model derived in
Step 1 and augment it with transition rates. Transition rates
specify how likely it is to move from one state to another and
how likely it is to be in a particular state at a particular time t.
In the ToE risk level estimation model each state refers to the
aggregated severity level for a set of vulnerabilities. Hence,
the state transition model describes the various risk levels that
the ToE may be in or arrive at for a particular time t. To
determine the transition rates, we aggregate over the relevant
misuse frequency estimates.
VI. EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF THE TOE RISK LEVEL
MODEL
Our ToE is the web server (200.30.0.2) of an academic
institution located at the DMZ zone in the network. Scanning
tools, such as the open source Nessus [21] tool, supply experts
with the following information. The server has two open
ports: tcp/80 listening to HTTP traffic and tcp/22 listening
to SSH traffic. In practice, the SSH connection allows System
Administrators to do maintenance work remotely from within
the subnet administration. The SSH service has vulnerability
CVE-2004-2320 and the HTTP service has vulnerability CVE-
2003-0190. Additionally, experts learn that the external fire-
wall (200.30.0.1) allows inbound and outbound HTTP traffic
from the Internet to the DMZ and that the internal firewall
(10.16.0.1) allows inbound and outbound HTTP and SSH
traffic between the DMZ and the LAN.
The ToE is regarded by its stakeholders (university staff
and students) as an asset that has high demand on avail-
ability and integrity (considering web pages are locally
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ToE
E CR low (L)
E IR high (H)
E AR high (H)
E CDP low-medium (LM)
CVE-2003-0190 CVE-2004-2320 CVE-2005-4762 CVE-2003-1562
B AV network (N) network (N) local (L) network (N)
B AC low (L) low (L) low (L) high (H)
B Au none (N) none (N) none (N) none (N)
T E high (H) functional (F) functional (F) functional (F)
T RL workaround (W) official fix (OF) official fix (OF) workaround (W)
T RC confirmed (C) confirmed (C) confirmed (C) confirmed (C)
B C partial (P) partial (P) complete (C) partial (P)
B I none (N) none (N) complete (C) none (N)
B A none (N) none (N) complete (C) none (N)
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF INPUT FOR CALCULATION OF MF AND MI
stored), but low demand on confidentiality. Additionally,
a successful exploit might result in moderate local dam-
age (i.e. low-medium). Thus, the environmental vector is
[E(CDP):LM/E(CR):L/E(IR):H/E(AR):H].
Vulnerability CVE-2003-0190 refers to a feature of
OpenSSH 3.6.1 P1 with Pluggable Authentication Mod-
ules (PAM) support enabled that “sends an error mes-
sage when a user does not exist, which allows re-
mote attackers to determine valid usernames via a tim-
ing attack” [22]. The base vector for this vulnerability
is [B(AV):N/B(AC):L/B(Au):N/B(C):P/B(I):N/B(A):N]. The
vulnerability is exploited via SSH command line and a proof-
of-concept code is available for automatic exploitation of this
design problem [23]. The exploitability is therefore high. In
terms of solutions to the vulnerability, one out of three vendors
involved supplies an official fix for the problem. For the others
there are workarounds available. The remediation level is con-
sidered to be workaround and the vulnerability is confirmed.
This gives the temporal vector: [T(E):H/T(RL):W/T(RC):C].
Vulnerability CVE-2004-2320 refers to a default con-
figuration on BEA WebLogic Server 8.1 SP 2 that “re-
sponds to the HTTP TRACE request, which can allow re-
mote attackers to steal information using cross-site tracing
(XST) attacks in applications that are vulnerable to cross-
site scripting” [22]. This vulnerability has the base vector:
[B(AV):N/B(AC):L/B(Au):N/B(C):P/B(I):N/B(A):N]. Further-
more, the vulnerability is exploited [24] by a crafted HTTP
containing a malicious script triggered when a victim clicks
on it in a web browser. Additionally, remediation is available
and requires software upgrade. The vulnerability has been
confirmed although Apache Software Foundation regards it
not as a security issue. This gives the temporal vector:
[T(E):F/T(RL):OF/T(RC):C].
We performed similar analysis for two more vulnerabilities:
CVE-2005-4762 also on BEA WebLogic 8.1 SP 2 and CVE-
2003-1562 on OpenSSH 3.6.1 P1. Table III summarises the
input for calculating MF and MI for each vulnerability present
in the ToE.
A. Deriving MF and MI estimates for each vulnerability
To derive the initial MF value, we make use of Bayes theo-
rem. Given the two random variables x and y, the probability
P for the variable x, given the variable y, can be calculated
from: P (x|y) = P (y|x)×P (x)P (y) . By allowing xi to be a complete
set of mutually exclusive instances, Bayes formula can be
extended to calculate the conditional probability of xi given
y. Details are in Jensen (1996) [25].
Considering the earlier discussed dependencies: P (B AR)
is independent, AC is dependent on AR; P (B AC) =
P (B AC|B AR), and Au is dependent on both AR and AC;
P (B Au) = P (B Au|(B AR,B AC)), we use the theory
of probability of the intersection and union of random events.
By applying Bayes theorem on the case where the random
event x is conditionally dependent on the two events y1 and
y2 we get: P (x|(y1, y2)) = P (x)×P ((y1,y2)|x)P (y1,y2) . Solving this
equation requires knowledge on the dependencies between y1
and y2. In the case of Au, which is conditionally dependent
on two events (AR and AC) that are internally dependent, we
use the following formulate to calculate the joint probability
function: P (y1, y2) = P (y1) + P (y2)− (P (y1)× P (y2)).
By solving Equation 1 for CVE-2003-0190 using the above
theorems and the normalization factor 13 we get the initial
frequency estimate for this vulnerability:
MFinit =
1.0 + 0.71 + 0.702
3
= 0.805
The final MF estimate for CVE-2003-0190 is derived by
computing the update factor from the temporal metrics at-
tributes and then applying this to the initial MF estimate. Note
that the normalization factors are 13 and
1
2 respectively.
MFuFac =
1.0 + 0.95 + 1.0
3
= 0.983
MF (CV E − 2003− 0190) = 0.805 + 0.983
2
= 0.894
MF for vulnerability CVE-2004-2320 is derived the same
way as for CVE-2003-0190, which gives:MF (CV E−2003−
2320) = 0.798. (Initial MF is 0.805 and update factor is 0.79).
Rounding both to two decimals gives: MF (CV E − 2003 −
0190) = 0.89 andMF (CV E−2003−2320) = 0.80. Similar,
MF for vulnerability CVE-2005-4762 is:MF (CV E−2005−
4762) = 0.80 and MF for vulnerability CVE-2003-1562 is:
MF (CV E − 2003− 1562) = 0.82.
MI for all vulnerabilities are derived using the MI equations
from Section IV-B (but without taking the collateral damage
potential into consideration as E CDP is equal for all vul-
nerabilities and do not affect the internal relations). This gives:
MI(CV E − 2003− 0190) = [0.14, 0.0, 0.0]
MI(CV E − 2003− 2320) = [0.14, 0.0, 0.0]
MI(CV E − 2005− 4762) = [0.41, 1.0, 1.0]
MI(CV E − 2003− 1562) = [0.14, 0.0, 0.0]
B. Deriving ToE risk level
We create the service level state transition diagram from the
MI estimate vectors. First, we need to group the vulnerabilities
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into service levels according to their severity or impact level.
We see that there are three vulnerabilities with the same
impact: CVE-2003-0190, CVE-2003-2320 and CVE-2003-
1562. The impact of these three vulnerabilities is lower than
the impact of the fourth vulnerability and we group these into
service level 1 (SL1). The fourth vulnerability; CVE-2005-
4762, has a larger impact and becomes service level 2 (SL2).
In addition, we have the full service level (SL0) and the no
service level (SLx). This gives four service levels: SL0, SL1,
SL2 and SLx.
The ToE risk level is given as a continuous-time Markov
process {Xt}t≥0 with a finite state space E, in which each
service level SLn can be identified with a subset of states in
E. Thus, E is the disjoint union {SL0 +...+ SLx}, where x is the
number of service levels. Furthermore, service levels {0,...,k}
correspond to operational states O; i.e., states specifying
levels of acceptable ToE risk level. Service levels {k+1,...,x}
denote the failed states. Thus, E = O + F, where O = {SL0+
... +SLk} and F = {SL(k+1)+ ... +SLx}. For our example
ToE we have three operational states (SL0, SL1, SL2) and
one failed state SLx.
The transition rates are derived from the MF estimates.
We assume that the ToE starts at the highest service level;
i0 ∈ SL0. Transitions between operational states represent
degradations and transitions to a failed state represent failures.
We do not consider repair or online implementation of security
solutions (such as dynamic software updates), meaning that no
transitions take place from a failed state: λfj = 0 for all f ∈ F.
Thus, failed states are absorbing. Transition rate between SL0
(state 1) and SL1 (state 2) is specified by MF (SL0SL1).
Transition rate between SL1 (state 2) and SL2 (state 3) is
specified byMF (SL1SL2). And, transition rate between SL2
(state 3) and SLx (state 4) is specified by MF (SL2SLx).
Table IV shows the transition rates for the ToE risk level state
model. Note that there are never transitions from a higher state
to a lower state (no repair). Also note that in this example we
assume independence between states.
The ToE will move from SL0 to SL1 if either one of the
three vulnerabilities: CVE-2003-0190, CVE-2003-2320 and
CVE-2003-1562, is exploited. If we assume that the three
vulnerabilities are mutually exclusive the transition rate be-
tween SL0 and SL1 equals the disjoint probability of the three
potential exploits (the event that a vulnerability is exploited).
As this adds up to more than 1.0, we simply use the average,
which is 0.84. (This is reasonable as all MF values are high
and as the variance between them is relatively low). Transition
rate from SL0 to SL2 equals the frequency of vulnerability
CVE-2005-4762: 0.80, as we allow for the single exploitation
of vulnerability CVE-2005-4762. To get to SL2 from SL1,
the ToE first needs to move from SL0 to SL1. Thus, transition
rate between SL1 and SL2 are dependent on transition rate
between SL0 and SL1 (MF (SL1SL2)|MF (SL0SL1)). The
same logic is used to derive the transition rate from service
level 2 (SL2) to service level x (SLx). That is, we assume that
the system do not go directly from full service level or SL1
to no service level (SLx).
SL0 SL1 SL2 SLx
SL0 0.0 0.84 0.80 0.0
SL1 0.0 0.0 0.67 0.0
SL2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.45
SLx 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TABLE IV
TOE RISK LEVEL TRANSITION RATE MATRIX
The transition rate matrix can be used to answer questions
like: “What is the risk level for a ToE at a particular time
t?”, “Is it likely that a particular vulnerability is exploited at
a particular time t?”, “What is a likely time before the ToE
will enter a non-reparable state?”, etc. To find answers to these
questions it is necessary to put the transition rates into a proper
time perspective. E.g., if we consider a time perspective of one
year, it is likely that the system will reach a non-reparable state
within less than 6 months (probability of 0.45). It is also likely
that within less than 7 months the integrity and availability of
the ToE is fully compromised. This makes sense as all four
vulnerabilities have a high frequency. Another interpretation
that can be used is that within any given time frame T , the
ToE will be fully compromised with a probability of 0.67 and
reached a non-reparable state with a probability of 0.45. (The
better way to express this is that there is almost a 70% chance
that the ToE will be fully compromised and a 45% chance
that it will reach a non-repairable state.) However, practice
and literature has shown that stakeholders, such as decision
makers, have problems understanding probability expressions
even when they are as simple as these [20]. One year is
thus a reasonable time frame taken the high frequency and
impact estimates of the four vulnerabilities considered in this
example. In most cases this means that security measures,
and in particular security measures targeting integrity and
availability, must be employed within a reasonable time frame.
A concrete expression of the ToE risk level, as that given
within the time frame of one year, will communicate this
message clearly to the decision maker.
VII. CONCLUSION
The paper describes a ToE risk level estimation model that
uses CVSS to estimate misuse frequency (MF) and misuse
impact (MI), and from these derive the risk level of a ToE.
The model is demonstrated using an example ToE. MF is
estimated from attributes in the base and temporal metrics of
CVSS and MI is estimated from attributes in the base and
environmental metrics of CVSS. The base metrics of CVSS is
used to establish the initial estimates of both MF and MI. MF
is then made attack specific by adding in factors concerning
the attack tools available, the existing security measures and
the report confidence. For MI, the initial MI of a potential
vulnerability exploit (attack) derived from the base metrics is
made ToE specific by taking the relevant security requirements
into consideration. An important factor to note for MI is that
there are no impacts of a potential vulnerability exploit (attack)
if there are no relevant requirements. This is a general risk
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assessment principle that is used to limit the amount of security
risks in need of treatment and to support cost-effective security
budgeting.
Note that the accuracy of the resulting MF and MI estimates,
and thus also the ToE risk level estimate, are dependent on
the accuracy of the values assigned to the base, temporal
and environmental metrics attributes that we use. That is,
the attribute internal weights given in Tables I and II. These
values are given by the CVSS. Lately, there have been some
discussions about the accuracy of these values. However,
our model is flexible in that it only uses these values as
interchangeable weights. This means that we only need to
update the MF and MI tables (Tables I and II) whenever CVSS
provides updated values provided that no new attributes are
introduced.
Future work includes a series of field studies of using the
model in practise at our industrial partners. Thus far, we have
tested the model on example ToEs. Future work also involve
merging the ToE risk level estimation model into a security
solution trade-off analysis [2] as part of a larger security
budgeting support tool that we are building. An attempt to
do so is currently ongoing as part of a field study.
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